Antitrust Litigation & Enforcement

The work that arises under four statutes. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reaches agreements that restrain trade, with horizontal price-fixing, bid-rigging and market allocation condemned per se and most other restraints judged under the rule of reason. Section 2 reaches monopolization and attempts at it, which require monopoly power or a dangerous probability of acquiring it plus exclusionary conduct. Section 7 of the Clayton Act reaches mergers whose effect may be substantially to lessen competition, enforced in advance through Hart-Scott-Rodino review. Section 5 of the FTC Act gives the Commission its own authority over unfair methods of competition. Private plaintiffs enforce the first three and recover treble damages and fees; the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission enforce all of them, criminally in the case of hard-core cartels.

The matter at whichever stage it arrives. Before signing, that is the overlap analysis and the Hart-Scott-Rodino filing, including the narrative and document requirements of the form in force since February 2025. During review, it is the second request, the economist's submissions and the remedy negotiation. When conduct is challenged, it is the defense or prosecution of monopolization, exclusive-dealing and pricing claims in federal and state court, through class certification, expert discovery and trial. When a cartel inquiry opens, it is the internal investigation, the leniency decision and the follow-on damages defense, which has its own page within this practice. One partner holds the matter from the first document request to the last, so what is said to the agency and what is said to the court are the same thing.

Yes. We represent clients in antitrust matters before the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, responding to second requests and civil investigative demands, negotiating clearance and remedies, and defending enforcement actions. We act for the companies in front of the agencies, and we map regulatory exposure early so it is handled alongside any private litigation.

If the deal crosses the Hart-Scott-Rodino size thresholds, which are adjusted every year, both parties file and wait 30 days, or 15 for a cash tender offer, before closing. Most filings clear in that window. If an agency issues a second request, the waiting period is suspended until both parties certify substantial compliance and then runs for a further 30 days, and the parties usually sign a timing agreement giving the agency longer in exchange for a defined schedule. Closing or integrating before the waiting period ends is gun-jumping, penalized by a civil fine for every day of violation, and that includes exchanging competitively sensitive data or taking operational control early. The review ends in clearance, a negotiated remedy such as a divestiture to an approved buyer, or a complaint seeking to enjoin the deal, and the merger agreement's outside date and efforts covenant are drafted around each of those outcomes.

Cartel exposure is managed by acting early and deliberately. We conduct internal investigations to establish the facts, advise on leniency and cooperation where it serves the client, preserve and produce documents under a defensible protocol, and prepare a defense against follow-on civil damages claims that often shadow a government action. The goal is to contain the matter and protect the enterprise rather than react to it piecemeal.

Both. Many matters resolve through negotiated clearance, consent decrees, or settlement, which can be faster and easier on the business than a contested proceeding. But credibility at trial is what makes a favorable resolution possible, so we prepare every matter as if it will be tried, building the economic and documentary record, retaining the right experts, and keeping the option to litigate open through the verdict and any appeal.